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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEAH M. DALY, Executrix for / 
the Estate of Eva Dean Daly, 
deceased, 
/ 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent/ 
: / ' • 
vs, Case No. 
GEORGE F. DALY/ / 13517 
Defendant and 
Appellant. / 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
The Appellant/ George F. Daly, appeals from 
the Interlocutory Decree of Divorce granted to 
the Respondents predecessor, Eva Dean Daly/ 
deceased/ on the 10th day of August/ 1973/ in 
the District Court for the Third Judicial 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
District in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge, 
presiding, together with the District Court's 
Orders of October 11, 1973, denying Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion to Modify 
Decree, and granting Plaintiff's Motion to 
Amend Decree, along with the District Court's 
Order of October 26, 1973, declaring the 
Respondent-Executrix, Leah M. Daly, to be the 
owner in fee simple of designated real property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The above matter came on regularly for a non-
jury trial on the 18th day of July, 1973, before 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
James S. Sawaya, Judge, presiding. On the 10th 
day of August, 1973, the District Court entered 
its Interlocutory Decree of Divorce pursuant 
to its Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, ordering, inter alia, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that the Plaintiff be awarded a Decree of 
Divorce from the Defendant, said Decree not 
becoming final and absolute until the expiration 
of three months from the date and entry of 
said Decree? and further, awarding to the 
Plaintiff the real property of the parties 
located at 1806 Bryan Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, subject to an equitable lien in favor of 
the Defendant in the amount of $8,000.00, 
together with, the ordinary life insurance policy 
on the life of the Defendant. 
On October 11, 1973, subsequent to the death 
of the Plaintiff, occurring September 23, 1973, 
the District Court denied the Defendant's 
Motions to Dismiss said action and Motion to 
Modify Decree so as to award to the Defendant 
the herein described real property and ordinary 
life insurance policy. On the 26th day of 
October, 1973, the District Court granted an 
Order determining the Respondent's Executrix, 
-3-
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Leah M. Daly, to be the owner in fee simple in 
said described real property and substituted 
said Executrix as party-plaintiff herein. The 
Defendant in the Lower Court is hereinafter 
referred to as Appellant and the substituted 
Plaintiff in the Lower Court is hereinafter 
referred to as Respondent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Interlocutory 
Decree of Divorce granted in the District Court 
insofar as it awards the real property situated 
at 1806 Bryan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and the ordinary life insurance policy to the 
Respondent, together with reversal of the 
District Court's Order denying Appellant's 
Motion to Dismiss and Appellant's Motion to 
Modify Decree, and said District Court's Order 
determining the Executrix, Leah M. Daly, to be 
the fee simple owner of said property, and 
remanding same to the District Court with 
-4-
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proper instructions to modify said Decree so 
as to award to the Appellant said real property 
and ordinary life insurance policy; or in the 
alternative, dismissing said matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
George F. Daly, now 67 years of age, and 
Eva Dean Daly, deceased, were married the 29th 
day of December, 1928, at Salt Lake City, Utah. 
During the course of said marriage, three 
children were born to the parties, all of whom 
have attained their majority and are not depen-
dent on either party for support. CR-3) Mrs. Dal 
worked throughout the marriage and Mr. Daly was 
regularly employed to the time he was retired 
on disability from the State of Utah. CR-6* 7 
& 81 Subsequent to his retirement, Mr. Daly 
received and continues to receive the monthly 
sums of $227.00 from Social Security and $77.50 
from State Retirement as his sole income. (R-12) 
Prior to their separation, the parties 
-5-
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resided together in their home located at 1806 
Bryan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. Said 
home represented the most substantial asset 
acquired by the parties during their marriage, 
and for the purchase of which they both, togethe 
with contributions from their daughter, Leah M. 
Daly, devoted their respective earnings. (R-27,5 
60,64 & 67) Leah M. Daly, Executrix herein, 
currently 43 years of age, resided with her 
parents throughout the marriage and made 
contribution to the family during said time. 
CR-6I Said home was purchased by the parties 
in joint tenancy in 1952 for a purchase price 
of $18,500.00. (R-5) A downpayment of approxi-
mately $5,000.00 was made from the equity 
remaining upon the sale of the prior home of 
the parties. CR-5 & 24) The payments upon the 
home were substantially completed at the time 
of the trial of the above matter. 
Mr. Daly was retired from the State of Utah 
-6-
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owing to back difficulties (R-30) and at the 
time of the trial herein suffered from diabetes, 
a heart condition, and prostate ailments. (R-
21 & 22) Owing to his condition of health, 
Mr. Daly is physically unable to undertake 
employment for his support. 
On September 23, 1973, 43 days following 
the making and entry of the Interlocutory Decree 
of Divorce herein and within the three-month 
interlocutory period, Mrs. Daly died of natural 
causes. Upon this change of circumstances, on 
the 27th day of September, 1973, Mr. Daly duly 
moved the District Court to dismiss the divorce 
action filed herein, or in the alternative, 
to modify the Decree so as to award to him the 
real property of the parties herein mentioned 
and said ordinary life insurance policy. On 
October 11, 1973, the District Court denied 
both Motions and on October 26, 1973, entered 
its Order allowing the Executrix, Leah M. Daly, 
-7-
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to be substituted as party-plaintiff herein, 
and further determining said Leah M. Daly 
to be the owner in fee simple of said real 
property• Appellant-Defendant, George F. 
Daly's, Notice of Appeal to this Honorable 
Court was filed November 26, 1973. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
AND/OR MODIFY THE INTERLOCUTORY DECREE 
OF DIVORCE IN LIGHT OF CHANGED CIRCUM-
STANCES. 
The law is clear in the State of Utah, that 
following the entry of a divorce decree, the 
court shall have continuing jurisdiction to 
alter or modify such decree with respect to 
the support and maintenance of the parties or 
division of property as may be provided therein 
as shall to the court be reasonable and neces-
sary. Utah: Code Annotated (1953) , Section 
-8-
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30-3-5 (1973 Supp.), specifically provides: 
When a decree of divorce is made, the 
court may make such orders in relation 
to the children, property, and parties, 
and the maintenance of the parties 
and children, as may be equitable. 
The court shall have continuing jurisdic-
tion to make such subsequent changes 
or new orders with respect to the 
support and maintenance of the parties, 
the custody of the children and of 
their support and maintenance, or the 
distribution of the property as shall 
be reasonable and necessary. 
Generally, to justify such a modification 
with respect to the division of property, a party 
must demonstrate a change in circumstances from 
those existing at the time the decree was 
entered. Cody v. Cody, 47 Ut. 456, 154 P. 952 
C1916). The determination as to what shall 
constitute a sufficient change of circumstances, 
as well as the original distribution of property 
itself, rests largely within the sound discre-
tion of the trial court, though such may not be 
exercised arbitrarily. Pinney v. Pinney, 66 
Ut. 612, 245 P. 329 (1926)• Stewart v. Stewart, 
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66 Ut. 366, 242 P. 947 (1926). Such discretion 
has been in fact held to be wider and more 
liberal where, as here, a modification is sough 
during the interlocutory period. Alley v. Alle: 
67 Ut. 316, 247 P. 301 (1926). For example, 
sufficient changes in circumstances to justify 
modifications have been found where a party 
experiences a substantial increment in earnings, 
Harrison v. Harrison, 22 Ut.2d 180, 450 P.2d 
456 QL969L, or a change in the health of a 
party, King v. King, 25 Ut.2d 163, 478 P.2d 492 
(1970). With respect to the division of 
property, this Honorable Court in Foreman v. 
Foreman, 111 Ut. 72, 176 P.2d 144 (1946), 
detailed the following elements to be determined 
by the trial court: 
CD. The amount and kind of property owned 
by each of the parties; 
C21 Whether the property was his before 
coverture or accumulated jointly; 
C3I The ability and opportunity of each . 
to earn money; 
C41 The financial condition and necessities 
of each party; 
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(5) The health of the parties; 
(6) The standard of living of the parties; 
(7) The duration of the marriage; 
(8) What the wife gave up by the marriage; 
and 
(9) What age they were when married. 
In the instant case, it must expressly be 
noted that the parties1 marriage (since 1928) 
was of long duration; that the earnings of each 
went largely into the purchase of their home 
at 1806 Bryan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah; that 
said home represented the only substantial asset 
and savings of the parties; that all children 
of the parties are of majority and independent 
of the parties; that the Appellant is of 
advanced years and in ill health and without 
employment or appreciable income; and perhaps 
most importantly, that the Plaintiff's spouse 
became deceased during the interlocutory period. 
Indeed, it would be most difficult to envision 
a greater change of circumstances subsequent 
to the entry of a divorce decree than the demise 
of one of the parties; again bearing in mind 
-11-
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the absence of any minor children requiring 
support. Under such a factual situation, it 
must be respectfully submitted, that the 
Honorable Trial Court abused its discretion in 
failing to modify the Decree so as to award to 
the Appellant the interest of the parties in 
the home, whose need of same is no less than 
compelling; together with the herein mentioned 
ordinary life insurance policy* 
Moreover, there is ample authority for the 
proposition that the Honorable Trial Court 
should well have dismissed the divorce action 
and vacated any award of property made pursuant 
thereto, where under circumstances as presented 
herein, a party becomes deceased during the 
interlocutory period. As stated by this Court 
in the case of In Re Johnson's Estate, 84 Ut. 
168, 25 P.2d 305 C1934]: 
The entry of the decree ... does not 
at once terminate the marriage rela-
tionship and give to the parties the 
status of single persons. That 
•12-
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relationship is dissolved when the 
decree becomes final. Id, at 306. 
(Emphasis added) (Citing with approval 
Sanders v, Industrial Commission, 64 
Ut. 372, 230 P. 1026 (1924); Utah 
Fuel Company v. Industrial Commission, 
65 Ut. 100, 234 P. 697 (1925); Spencer 
v. Clark, 54 Ut. 83, 179 P. 741 (1919); 
Salt Lake City v. Indus trial Commi s s ion, 
22 P.2d 1046 (Ut. 1933). 
This Court, in Johnsonf s Estate, furthered: 
Under the doctrine of these cases 
and under the plain language of the 
statute, [the predecessor to Utah 
•' Code Annotated C1953) Sections 30-3-6 
& 30-3-7 (1973 Supp.)], the court 
had jurisdiction to vacate the interlocu-
tory decree at any time before it became 
final and thus prevent the decree from 
becoming final. The death of the 
defendant before the decree became 
final would be sufficient ground for 
vacating the decree of divorce, as no 
final judgment could be entered against 
a deceased person and no one could be 
substituted for him in such an action. 
Id. at 306 CEmphasis added). 
Upon the foregoing authorities, it must be 
indisputable that the Appellant became widowed 
upon the death of the Respondent's predecessor 
in this action; that the divorce never did nor 
could become final and effective, being moot 
-13-
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upon Mrs. Daly's death as a matter of law; 
and that as Decedent's surviving husband and 
joint tenant to the property in question, 
Appellant became the fee simple owner of same 
by operation of law. Indeed, as stated by the 
Court in Johnson's Estate, the district court 
was without authority to substitute the Decedent 
Executrix as party-plaintiff herein, least yet 
declare her to be the owner of said real propert 
in fee simple. As specifically held by the 
Court in Johnson's Estate: 
Since the plaintiff was the wife of 
... [the deceased] at the time of 
his death, it would naturally follow 
that she became vested with every 
right which the law grants to the 
surviving spouse. Id. at 307 (Emphasis 
added). 
In the case of In Re Johnson's Estate, supra, 
involving a factual situation substantially 
similar to the case at bar, where the husband 
died during the interlocutory period, the Court 
held the surviving wife to have letters of 
administration of the deceased's estate issued 
-14-
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to her as a matter of right. Similar to the 
governing statute in the authorities heretofore 
cited, Utah Code Annotated (1953), Sections 
30-3-6 SL 30-3-7 (1973 Supp.), provide: 
If after the hearing of any action 
for divorce the court renders a decree 
of divorce for either party, the decree 
shall specifically provide, that it 
shall not become absolute until the 
expiration of three months from the 
day it is signed by the court and 
entered by the clerk in the register 
of actions, or until such other time 
as the court may specifically designate, 
but not more then six months thereafter. 
... the decree of divorce shall become 
absolute at the expiration of three 
months from the entry thereof? unless 
an appeal or other proceedings for 
review are pending, or the court, 
before the expiration of said period 
for sufficient cause, otherwise orders. 
The court, upon application or on its 
own motion for good cause shown, shall 
have the authority to waive, alter, 
or extend the period of time before 
the decree shall become absolute, but 
not to exceed six months from the 
signing and entry of the decree. 
Pursuant to such authority, the District 
Court in the instant case specifically condition 
-15-
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the Decree of Divorce to provide: 
That said decree shall not become 
final and absolute until the expiration 
of three months from the date of entry 
of said decree, that upon the expira-
tion of three months from the date 
of entry of said decree, the decree 
shall become final and absolute, dis-
solving the bonds of matrimony existing 
between the plaintiff and defendant 
and restoring them to the status of 
single unmarried persons• 
In the case of Spencer v. Clark, 54 Ut. 83, 
179 P. 741 (1919), an action regarding real 
property brought by a surviving husband against 
the executor of his wife's estate, where as 
here, the latter died prior to the expiration 
of an interlocutory decree of divorce, the 
Court specifically overturned the trial court's 
ruling that the interlocutory decree had become 
absolute. Interestingly, in the divorce action 
giving rise to the litigation in Spencer, the 
trial court dismissed same after the death of 
the plaintiff on motion of the defendant. This 
procedure was similarly followed with approval 
in the later case of In Re Johnson's Estate, 
-16-
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supra, wherein Spencer was cited with approval. 
See In Re Johnson's Estate, 84 Ut. 168, 25 P.2d 
305, 306 (1954). 
In Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 
22 P.2d 1046 (Utah 1933), this Court, in affirm-
ing an award of the Industrial Commission to 
the widow where, as in the case at bar, the 
husband died during an interlocutory period, 
similarly noted that the trial court had set 
aside and dismissed the divorce action. 
Admittedly, in the more recent case of In Re 
Harper's Estate, 1 Ut.2d 296, 265 P.2d 1005 
C19541, this Court expressly overruled Salt Lake 
City v. Industrial Commission, supra, and In 
Re Johnson's Estate, supra, ,f[T]o the extent 
the decisions in those cases indicate approval 
of ex parte Orders as the basis for vacating 
divorce decrees affecting property rights...." 
Harper's Estate, supra, at 1007. The facts 
presented in Harper's Estate are essentially 
-17-
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identical to those herein. There, the survivir 
widow during the interlocutory period obtained 
an ex parte dismissal of the divorce action 
and brought an action against the administrator 
seeking a decree vesting her with title to 
property of the parties as the surviving joint 
tenant. This Court, on appeal, reversed the 
trial court's order vesting title in the widow, 
but remanded same "with directions to dismiss 
the petition without prejudice and allow the 
parties to be heard upon the merits in the 
divorce action should they so desire". Harper's 
Estate at 1007. There, the Court noted without 
necessarily so holding stated: 
However, the occurrence of death does 
not abate the action itself and to 
the extent that property rights are 
determined by the decree, it remains 
effective and becomes final in the 
same manner and at the same time as 
between living persons. 
However, it must be observed that the Court's 
prime concern in Harper's Estate and, indeed 
-18-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
its holding^ was simply the voiding of an 
ex parte order of dismissal where, unlike the 
instant case, an opportunity was not given to 
interested parties to be heard in defense of 
any rights granted by the interlocutory decree. 
See Rasmussen v. Call, 55 Ut. 597, 188 P. 275 
(1920), (quoted with approval in Harperf s 
Estate!. In the case at bar, Appellantfs Motion 
to Dismiss and his Motion to Modify Decree were 
not sought ex parte, but rather all interested 
parties through their counsel were given notice 
and represented. In the words of the Court: 
This statutory power [of Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), Section 30-3-7 
(1973 Supp.)] does not allow the court 
to vacate a decree without legal cause 
nor without giving all persons whose 
rights are involved an opportunity to 
be heard. In Re Harper*s Estate, 
supra, at 1006. 
Notwithstanding, the court did specifically 
find: 
The death of a party before the decree 
becomes absolute may under some circum-
stances be sufficient cause to vacate 
-19-
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the decree in its entirety. Other 
factors, such as the welfare of minor 
children, may in some instances warrant 
a different disposition of property. 
In each case the court must give each 
person whose rights are involved the 
opportunity to be heard* Id. at 1007 
CEmphasis added}. 
Accordingly, Harper's Estate can be cited 
only for the proposition that in granting the 
dismissal of an interlocutory decree or a 
modification thereof, all factors must be 
considered and all interested persons given 
an opportunity to be heard. Under the facts 
of the instant case, the interests of all were 
represented and the equities clearly prepondered 
in favor of Appellant. This being so, the 
Honorable Trial Court abused its discretion in 
failing to grant to Appellant a dismissal or 
a modification of the decree. In the language 
of the statute, the awarding to the Appellant 
upon the death of his wife, being not only the 
most "equitable" distribution of property, is 
indeed and unquestionably both "reasonable and 
-20-
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necessary". Utah Code Annotated (1953), Section 
30-3-5 (1973 Supp.). 
CONCLUSION 
It is, therefore, submitted that upon the 
basis of the foregoing authorities, the drastic 
alteration in the circumstances of the parties 
occasioned by the death of Mrs. Daly, and the 
compelling equities of the case as evidence by 
the necessitious condition of the Appellant, 
that the Trial Court erred and abused its dis-
cretion in failing to grant Appellant1s Motion 
to Dismiss or his Motion to Modify the Decree 
so as to award to him the home of the parties, 
together with the ordinary life insurance policy, 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID J. KNOWLTON 
HORACE J. KNOWLTON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Two copies of the above and foregoing Brief 
of Appellant were posted in the U.S. mail 
postage prepaid and addressed to the Attorney 
for the Respondent, Grant McFarland, at 725 
Union Pacific Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101, and copies thereof were delivered to the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court, State Capitol Build-
ing, Salt Lake City, Utah, on this day of 
July, 1974. 
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